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THE ILLINOIS REVISED CITIES AND
VILLAGES ACT: A STUDY
J. STANLEY STROUD*
PRIOR LEGISLATION

B EFORE

1870 most, if not all, cities, villages, and incorporated towns in Illinois were organized under special
charters granted to each of them separately by special act
of the General Assembly. Much of the time of the early
legislators was devoted to the enactment of such legislation.' While the general provisions of the various special
charters, were, for the most part, reasonably similar, there
was nothing like universal uniformity, some municipalities
receiving a much more liberal grant of powers than others.
After the prohibition, by the Illinois Constitution of 1870,
of this type of special legislation, the General Assembly,
in 1872, enacted the Cities and Villages Act.2 This Act, constituting as it did the general charter of all municipalities incorporated thereunder, authorized new cities and villages to be incorporated under its provisions, and authorized already existing cities, villages, and incorporated towns
to abandon their prior organization and become incorporated
as a city or village under the provisions of the Act.
Its provisions, well organized and reasonably concise,
Member of the Illinois Bar. Formerly Assistant Counsel to the Illinois Municipal Code Commission. While the views here set forth are those of the author,
this article could not have been written without the helpful assistance of Kenneth
C. Sears, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, formerly Counsel to the
Illinois Municipal Code Commission, for which acknowledgment is here made.
1 The five volumes of Laws 1869 stand as mute evidence of this fact. One of the
volumes contains all of the public laws enacted at that session. The other four
contain nothing but private laws, nearly all of which related to legislation for
cities, villages, and incorporated towns.
2 Laws 1871-2, 218 et seq.
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probably served as a readily workable charter for the municipalities of 1872. The rapid growth of municipalities in the
years following, however, brought a commensurate increase
in the complexity of social problems requiring legislative
attention. With this rapid growth, municipal legislation kept
at least even pace, both in quantity and complexity. From
the less than 30,000 words in the Cities and Villages Act as
originally enacted, state legislation in Illinois directly affecting cities, villages, and incorporated towns exceeded
600,000 words by 1938. That is an increase of something over
two thousand per cent. It is reasonably certain that orderly
presentation would deteriorate to chaos as a result of such a
growth in any body of law unless that growth were made
to follow a long-range organizational plan. Municipal law in
Illinois, however, increased in accordance with no plan.
Inevitable chaos was the result.
Additions were supplied to the Cities and Villages Act
by wholesale amendment. In the years following its enactment, probably no regular session of the General Assembly
passed without some alterations of or additions to its provisions. For much of the specialized legislation required for
Illinois municipalities, however, there was no appropriate
place within the basic confines of the original eleven articles of the Cities and Villages Act. The only possible disposition, therefore, was to present such legislation in the form of
separate acts. Particularly was this true with regard to
Chicago, whose population increase, out of all proportion
with that of any other city in the state, created many prob3
lems requiring specialized legislation.
Probably the chief reason new legislation was embodied
in separate statutes rather than added to the Cities and Villages Act by amendment, however, was the exclusive appli3 "Specialized legislation" is used advisedly. To avoid the prohibition in Art.
IV, § 22 of the Illinois Constitution against the passage of special laws "amending
the charter of any . . . city . . ." the General Assembly has usually made legislation, which it desired to apply only to Chicago, generally applicable to all
cities, or to all cities, villages, and incorporated towns, having a population
over 250,000, or over 500,000. To enable Chicago to obtain a modicum of home
rule, however, Section 34 was added to Art. IV of the Constitution by amendment
adopted November 8, 1904, authorizing the passage of special legislation of specified types for Chicago.
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cation of that act, by virtue of a limitation in its title, 4 to
cities and villages. Since the Illinois Constitution forbids an
act from embracing any subject not expressed in its title,'
the legislators found it impossible to add to that act any
provision relating uniformly to all Illinois cities, villages,
and incorporated towns. Whenever it was desired to grant
any power to, or impose any duty upon, all such municipalities alike, therefore, it was necessary to pass a new act.
Similarly, when legislation was desired to apply exclusively
to incorporated towns, or to incorporated towns within a
particular population classification, a separate act was needed.
By 1938, sixty-seven years after the enactment of the
Cities and Villages Act, there were nearly two hundred separate acts to be found in the Illinois Revised Statutes relating
directly to cities, villages, and incorporated towns. All of
these statutes, compositely, formed the corporate charters
of all Illinois municipalities incorporated under general law,
or, in some way, regulated in part municipalities organized
under special charters. Their very numerical quantity revealed the utter necessity of their integration into a unified
code. Not only were the statutes numerous, they were also
contradictory,' ambiguous, and, wonder of wonders, incomplete in a number of places. Many of the provisions thereof
were obsolete. Nearly all had been written in the wordy
"legalese" which is far too prevalent even in modern legislation.' Revision, therefore, became essential.
THE MUNICIPAL CODE COMMISSION

When State Senator Dixon8 was mayor of Dixon, Illinois, he discovered that it was impossible to administer a
city in strict accordance with the law for the simple reason
that the law was in such confusion that, in many cases, it
4 The title to the act read: "An Act to provide for the incorporation of cities
and villages." Laws 1871-2, 218.
5 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
6 Compare, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 83 with § 529.
7 This in spite of the fact that a legislative body is presumed to have used no
superfluous words in a statute: Platt v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 48 at 58,
25 L. Ed. 424 at 427 (1879); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, 127 F. (2d) 378 (1942).
8 Now Judge Dixon of the 15th Illinois Circuit.
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could not even be found. Proposals for revision had been
made in 1929 and 1933 without success, but Senator Dixon
tried again in 1935. He too was unsuccessful. He tried again
in 1937 and this time, with the assistance of Senator Keane
of Chicago as co-sponsor, his bill for the creation of a Municipal Code Commission9 became a law. 10 It charged the Commission with the duty of preparing a proposed revision of the
law relating to cities, villages, and incorporated towns and
of reporting such revision back to the next regular session
of the General Assembly, to be held in 1939, for legislative
action.
The late DeWitt Billman, then Executive Secretary of
the Legislative Reference Bureau, undertook to frame the
revised code for the Commission. He prepared an outline
for the reorganization of the pertinent laws and, with the
aid of his staff, commenced the task of rearranging the existing statutes to fit into that outline. Pressure of other work,
however, slowed his progress and finally necessitated his
abandonment of the project. In August, 1938, the Commission selected Kenneth C. Sears, Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, to prepare the revision.1 Since only
a small portion of the work had been completed in time to
report to the General Assembly at its regular session in
1939, a bill was passed in that year which continued the existence of the Commission until 1941.
PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF THE REVISED ACT

Completing the rearrangement of the pertinent statutory
provisions into their proper places in a comprehensible organizational plan proved no light task. Statutes, all or a
part of whose provisions belonged in the revision, were found
scattered through twelve chapters of the Illinois statutes.
9 Senator Keane was chosen as Chairman, and Senator Dixon as Secretary, of
the commission thus created. Other members included Senators Harold G. Ward
(Chicago), Thomas E. Madden (Peoria), and T. MacDowning (Macomb); Representatives Sidney Parker (Texaco), Frank Holten (East St. Louis), Charles
Weber (Chicago), Frederick Rennick (Buda), and Hugh Green (Jacksonville),
Mayors David McClugage (Peoria), Leo J. Struif (Alton), Charles F. Brown
(Rockford), and Henry Penfield (Evanston); and City Attorney Charles H.
Edwards (Aurora). Upon renewal of the Commission in 1939, Mayor Edward J.
Kelly (Chicago) was appointed in place of Mr. Edwards.
10 Laws 1937, 206.
11 The author assisted him in this work.
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In the chapter entitled Railroad and Improvement Aid
Bonds, 2 for example, appeared an act placing a general
limitation on municipal indebtedness. The Cities and Villages chapter, itself, contained provisions relating not only
to cities, villages, and incorporated towns but also to counties, townships, school districts, sanitary districts, forest preserve districts, park districts, road districts, water districts,
fire protection districts, public health districts, river conservancy districts, mosquito abatement districts, and tuberculosis sanitarium districts. 18 Separate acts dealing with
similar subjects often appeared several hundred sections
apart in the Cities and Villages chapter. 4 In a few instances
almost identical provisions appeared more than once. 5 A
long index immeasurably aided a searcher for the law, but
it was inadequate 1 6 and inconvenient. After the statutes to
be revised had been placed under the appropriate headings of the outline adopted, the actual revision work was
commenced.
The most fundamental restriction placed upon the revisors by the Commission was the avoidance of changes in the
existing law which might create controversy. This restriction, the Commission realized, would not only effectively
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 113, § 44.
18 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, §§ 662.1, and 1177.
14 See, for example, sections referred to in note 6 ante.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 49, for example, was practically identical with
§ 830; § 50 was identical with § 831. The assumption in most such cases is that
the General Assembly enacts a particular provision without realizing (probably
because of the confusion already existing in the statutes) that the same provision
is already law. Sometimes the repetitious provisions vary so minutely, however,
that it is obvious that one statute is the model for the other. Such statutes
occasionally can be blamed to legislative mistake. At the 1941 session of the
Illinois General Assembly, for instance, one senator introduced Senate Bill No.
698, and later introduced a carbon copy of the same bill as Senate Bill No. 715,
thinking he was introducing some other measure. The General Assembly passed
both bills. Governor Green, alert to the situation, approved the first and vetoed
the second. See 62nd General Assembly, Digest of Laws Enacted, pp. 279 and
285. Not all governors have been so careful.
16 The division "Cities and Villages" in the index to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939 occupied
thirty-three columns. In 1927 the Illinois Municipal League published a "Special
Index to Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Relating to Cities, Villages, and
Incorporated Towns (Bulletin No. 31)," designed to supplement the general indices
in the two editions of the Revised Illinois Statutes. The preface to that bulletin
states: "All municipal officials who have used the 1927 revised statutes (both
Smith-Hurd and Cahill) must realize that a great amount of work has been
spent on the indices to the statutes. While they are very good for general purposes they are not, however, as satisfactory as they might be for specialized
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prevent the drafting of anything resembling a model
municipal code, but would, in fact, necessitate the retention
of nearly all of the defects and deficiencies already existing
in the substance of the law. The Commission members, however, being legislators and mayors, knew painfully well that
the inclusion of even one controversial change would amost
surely block the passage of the entire revised code.1" The
chief aim of the revisors, therefore, was limited to the rearrangement, consolidation, codification, and clarification of
the existing law. Where it was felt, however, that the law
was clearly unjust, deficient, or incomplete and could be
remedied by a change not subject to a reasonable controversy, the change was included. The General Assembly
made a number of substantive changes in the law, by amendment to the bill containing the revision, but over the inclusion
of such changes, of course, the Commission had no control.
After the revision had been completed, an analysis revealed that all but eight or ten of the nearly eighteen hundred sections included therein had received some revision.
Approximately fifty of the sections so completely lacked
organization and clarity that entirely new sections were
drafted to supersede them. Obsolete sections were omitted",
and other sections were consolidated" to avoid repetition
purposes. The needs of mayors, village presidents, corporation counsel, city
attorneys, police magistrates, city clerks, and other municipal officials are not
completely recognized. Cross-indexing between sections and the indexing of
material within sections is not complete. As a result, a great amount of time
is lost by persons interested in municipal work in search for municipal law . . .
The preparation of this index has been a new venture. It is not as complete as
we hope to make it in future years."
17 As it worked out, the inclusion of a controversial change added to Senate
Bill No. 10, containing the revised code, by House Amendment No. 57, introduced
by Representative Libonati, almost did block the passage of the bill. See history
of Senate Bill No. 10 in Final Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the Sixtysecond General Assembly, State of Illinois, p. 30.
18 Observe these examples of deletion: (1) Art. IX of the Cities and Villages
Act of 1872, except § 16, which is now § 86-1 of the revised act, and § 50, which is
now § 58-1 of the revised act; (2) an Act providing for the consolidation of
local governments in Chicago, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, §§ 208-64 inclusive; (3)
an Act providing for Water Districts in Cook and Lake Counties, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1939, Ch. 24, §§ 461-80 inclusive.
19 No attempt was made to consolidate the considerable number of acts dealing
with the subject of waterworks. This subject matter is an highly important one
and it was feared that an attempt to consolidate these acts might arouse controversy. This material was, therefore, assigned to nine of the eighty-seven
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and overlapping. 20 Provisions which had been declared unconstitutional, but had never been repealed, were of course
eliminated. Where the Illinois courts had made a clear holding in a case interpreting any section that was to be included
in the revision, that holding, in most instances, was codified
into the revision of that section. Discretion had to be employed at this point not only in distinguishing between holdings and dicta, but also in determining what holdings should
be codified. Some of the statutory provisions had been the
subject of much judicial interpretation. To have expressed,
in the form of a statute, all of the holdings of the various
courts thereon would have made for too much elaboration. This would have been particularly true of the sections
of the Local Improvements Act, which had been the subject
of a great deal of litigation. By far the bulk of the actual
revision work was devoted to clarification of the law by the
elimination of verbosity.2 1
articles of the Revised Cities and Villages Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, HI
74-1 to 82-20 inclusive. As a result, the special powers concerning this subject
are still in confusion and overlap. For example, several alternative methods of
procedure are set forth for the exercise of the power granted municipalities
to construct and maintain a waterworks system. That the substitution of but
one method for the several now in effect would lessen confusion, as well as
statutory mass, is illustrated by the case of Huggins v. City of Pinckneyville,
239 Ill. App. 213 (1925). There the petitioner argued that there were "at least
five statutes under which the city may construct and maintain a waterworks
system," and that the city had not complied with any of them. The city answered
that it need not comply with any of them since, under Ch. 24, § 65.4, it had a
general power to borrow money and issue bonds for the construction or the
improvement of its waterworks and to levy taxes to pay therefor. The court
held, in effect, that "the city could not construct and maintain a system of
waterworks without complying with one of the several statutes pertaining to
that subject." For further confusion, see Henry A. Keith & Co. v. City of
Du Quoin, 89 Ill. App. 36 (1900); Trustees, etc. v. City of Jacksonville, 61 Ill. App.
199 (1895). The Local Improvements Act also contained several provisions regarding waterworks: see, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, §§ 714, 733,
783, 796 and 797; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, §§ 84-15a, 84-33a, 84-77a, 84-89a, and
84-89b. A general revision of this material should be undertaken.
20 Many of the one hundred and sixty-six acts consolidated into the Revised
Cities and Villages Act contained partial-invalidity sections. Obviously, all such
sections could be consolidated into one and made to apply to the revised act
as a whole. This, alone, eliminated many sections. The same was true of
sections stating that the power granted by an act was in addition to all powers
theretofore granted, or of sections containing savings clauses.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 598, started with these words: "That every
city and village in this State shall have the right, power and authority, and
such right, power and authority are hereby granted ....
." These twenty-four
words were reduced to seven, to-wit: "Every city and village has the power ..
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 41-2.
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Pension, annuity, and benefit fund acts relating to municipal officers constituted over one-third of the former Cities
and Villages chapter. None of these acts was included in the
Revised Cities and Villages Act. While the acts, strictly
speaking, are a part of the general municipal law, they
would probably more properly belong in a pension, annuity,
and benefit fund chapter of the Illinois statutes. Then, too,
inclusion thereof would have raised a number of nearly insurmountable technical problems. Moreover, it was obvious
that the inclusioh of these bulky acts in the revision would
make an already lengthy bill into one of prodigious size for
they would have increased the size of Senate Bill No. 10,
which contained the revised code, by at least two hundred
printed pages. Since the Commission members sensed that
in the revision's bulk lay a scare factor which would constitute the greatest menace to its passage, they determined not
to include these acts in the revision.
All of the suggested revision was first typed in such a
way as to show all proposed additions to and deletions from
any existing section. This was accomplished by having the
material typed in triple space, placing all words to be deleted above numbered lines and underlining all new words
to be added. The section, as it was proposed to be revised,
was then typed a second time in single space for easy reading. An explanation of all changes, other than mere rephrasings and condensations, to be made in a section was included
after each section.
About once a month the material revised to date was
mimeographed and distributed to the members of the Commission, to corporation counsel or mayors of the larger municipalities, to the Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau, and
to anyone else who displayed interest in the project.
The revision was introduced in the Senate of the Illinois
General Assembly on January 15, 1941, as Senate Bill No. 10.
Running five hundred and fifty-two printed pages, the bill
gained for itself the doubtful distinction of being one of the
longest bills ever introduced in Illinois. Five and a half
months after its introduction, on the last night of the session,
it received final legislative approval. By that time, however,
it had been amended one hundred and fifty-seven times in
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the Senate and fifty-seven times in the House. With Governor
Green's approval on August 15, 1941, the bill became a law.
To insure that everyone had plenty of time in which to study
the new law before having to act under it, the House proposed an amendment 22 postponing the effective date of the
act 23 until January 1, 1942.
GENERAL CHANGES EFFECTED IN THE FORMER LAW

Probably the most fundamental change produced by the
Revised Cities and Villages Act 24 was the consolidation, in
it, of the statutory provisions theretofore contained in one
hundred and sixty-six separate acts. 25 These separate acts
were repealed 21 inasmuch as a revision of their provisions
was incorporated into the new statute. 27 The revised act
House Amendment No. 50. See House Journal, June 25, 1941.
It is the author's opinion that all except emergency legislation should be
given such a postponed effective date. Under Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13, bills
approved prior to July 1, except emergency bills, take effect on July 1 unless
otherwise provided. Since a regular session lasts until June 30, and a goodly
share of the bills passed are passed in the last two weeks of the session, it
ordinarily takes the Governor nearly all of July to consider and act upon all of
the legislation passed. It is ordinarily impossible, therefore, to publish the
Session Laws and have them ready for distribution until late in August or early
in September. The citizens of the state are, however, required to abide by the
new laws as soon as they become effective, and no maxim is better established
than Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Just such an illustration was House Bill
No. 173, Laws 1941, I, 550, which caused a great deal of inconvenience because of
its early effective date. This bill prohibited any person from transacting business
under an assumed name unless he filed an acknowledged certificate, setting forth
the name of the business and the names and addresses of all individuals conducting the business, within thirty days after the effective date of the act or suffer
the penalty therein imposed. Approved on July 17, the bill became effective on
that day, yet the Session Laws were not ready for distribution until September,
well after the filing deadline had passed.
24 The short title is "The Revised Cities and Villages Act," Ill Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 24, § 1.1, though the full title is "An Act concerning cities, villages, and incorporated towns, and to repeal certain Acts herein named."
25 Of these separate acts, 146 formerly appeared in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24;
4 in Ch. 23; 1 in Ch. 46; 1 in Ch. 48; 2 in Ch. 70; 2 in Ch. 105; 1 in Ch. 111%;
2 in Ch. 111%; 3 in Ci. 113; 2 in Ch. 131%; 1 in Ch. 145; and 1 in Ch. 147.
26 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 87-4.
27 Art. XII of the Cities and Villages Act of 1872, dealing with special legislation
for Chicago, was adopted by the voters of that city by referendum under the
authority granted by Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34. Under the terms thereof,
Art. XII cannot be repealed without the consent of the voters of Chicago.
Repeal of Art. XII, is, therefore, made contingent upon the approval thereof
by such voters at any general, city, or special election at which the city council
of Chicago designates the question shall be submitted. A revision of this article
was included in the Revised Cities and Villages Act, as Art. XXI thereof, subject
to the condition that its provisions are to become effective only when approved
by the voters of Chicago at the election at which the repeal of Art. XII is
approved.
22
23
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further provided for the repeal of thirty other statutes which
appeared to have become deadweight on the statute book,
either because they had been declared unconstitutional but
had never been repealed 2 or because they had been of such
a temporary nature that they had become obsolete. Among
this latter group were eighteen validating acts which, by
their own terms, had only retroactive application.29
Previous comment on the disorganization of the former
law demonstrates that rearrangement of the law according
to subject matter and population classification was another
change of almost equal moment. Under the general plan
adopted, all provisions relating to incorporation, union, annexation, disconnection, and dissolution were placed at the
beginning of the act, followed by provisions concerning municipal officers and employees and then by provisions dealing with finance. Provisions granting special powers to municipalities were arranged in separate articles, listed alphabetically. Since neither an arrangement of the law according
to subject matter alone nor according to population classification alone seemed feasible, compromise was inescapable.
While most of the provisions were arranged according to
subject matter, provisions in general acts pertaining solely
to municipalities having a population of 150,000 or more were
placed together in a separate article. 0 This classification
was considered desirable since all such provisions at the
present time are of concern only to the City of Chicago.
Another fundamental change was the adoption of a consistent terminology. "Municipality," for example, is defined
to mean a city, village, or incorporated town in the State of
Illinois.3' This single definition achieved not only uniformity
See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 866a-866g.
Certain of these statutes appeared in Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. Ch. 24, §§ 358n,
409, 410, 460f, 561a, 664.5-664.8, 664.12, 664.13, 664.14, 69T, 697c, 697d-697e, 697f,
697g, 697h-697i, 697j-697jj, 6970, and 808a. The other twelve acts, repealed because
they appeared to be obsolete, were printed in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, §§ 208-64,
368, 439, 461-80, 491, 534, 540, 662a, 697, and 866a-866g; and in Laws 1917, 227, and
Laws 1872-3, 67.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, §§ 22-1 to 22-49 inclusive.
81 By a House amendment, the terms "municipal" and "municipality" as used
in the Revised Cities and Villages Act were defined not to include an "incorporated town which has superseded a civil township." Cicero is the only municipality in Illinois which comes within this exception. It is difficult to gauge the
effect of this amendment. It probably means that Cicero has none of the powers
28
29
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of expression but permitted a saving of thousands of words
throughout the act by allowing the substitution of but one
word for ten. The term "corporate authorities" is defined to
include the city council of a city and the board of trustees
of a village or incorporated town. These legislative bodies
were formerly designated as the "governing body," "legislative body," "corporate authorities," "legislative authority," "city council," "mayor and city council," "board of
trustees," or "president and board of trustees."
To give uniformity to ballot forms and to conform to the
Elections Act, 32 all propositions to be submitted to referendum were rewritten so as to be stated in the form of
"yes" or "no" questions.13 Heretofore, such propositions
were required to be submitted sometimes in the form of a
"'yes" or "no" question and sometimes in the form of "for"
or "against."
The system devised for numbering the sections of the
revised act is entirely new so far as the state legislative
acts of Illinois are concerned. Its merit, however, has been
proved by its use in the statutes of other states and also in
the Municipal Code of Chicago. Each section number contains two numbers separated by a hyphen, the first being the
number of the article in which that section appears, the
second being the position of that section in the article. Thus,
section twenty of article six is numbered Section 6-20.1'
Two numbering systems have been employed in Illinois
legislative enactments heretofore: (1) the sections in each
article are numbered consecutively, the first section in each
article being numbered one, or (2) the sections are numgranted to, or duties imposed on, other municipalities by the act, except as provided by § 87-1.1, which section was likewise added to the act by a House amendment.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46, § 305.
33 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 3-2, which is a revision of Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 140, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 7-24, which is a
revision of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 387.
34 An exception was made with regard to numbering the sections in Art. 84,
which contains a revision of the Local Improvements Act. As noted above, that
act had been the subject of a great deal of litigation. So much case law interpreting many of its sections exists that to have given these sections new section
numbers would, it was feared, have unduly inconvenienced a searcher for that
law. The revision of each section of that act was, therefore, given the same
section, or second, number as the original section even though this meant retaining alphabetical numbers where they existed in the Local Improvements Act.
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bered consecutively throughout the act. The first system has
the advantage of elasticity since sections may be added at
the end of each article without giving the sections a fractional, decimal, or alphabetical number, such as Section
14/2, 14.1, or 14a; it has the disadvantage of requiring all
references to the section to specify both the number of the
section and the number of the article, that is, to refer to the
section as "Section - of Article -. " The second system has
the advantage of conciseness in reference since the section
may be identified solely by a reference to its sectional number; but it lacks the advantage of elasticity. The system
employed in the Revised Cities and Villages Act combines
the advantages of the other two systems and eliminates their
disadvantages.
Systematic rewriting of the statutes that were revised
produced the following grammatical and structural changes
in the former law: (1) long sentences were broken into two
or more shorter sentences wherever practicable; (2) enumerations were placed in a "(1), (2), (3)" order; (3) use of
the future tense, so common in legislative enactments, was
eliminated, the word "shall" being reserved for use in the
imperative; (4) "provided" clauses and "and/or" expressions were eliminated; (5) sections were divided into reasonably short paragraphs; (6) long sections were divided into
two or more shorter sections wherever practicable; and (7)
wordy provisions were stated more concisely. The word
"any" or the word "all," for example, was used instead of
the common expression "any or all," and either the word
"each" or the word "every" was used instead of the expression "each and every."
SPECIFIC CHANGES EFFECTED IN

THE FORMER LAW

For the benefit of those who find it necessary to consult
the Illinois law relating to cities, villages, and incorporated
towns, the specific changes affected by the Revised Cities
and Villages Act in the former acts which it supersedes, and
the provisions added to such former acts by the Revised Act,
are hereinafter noted and explained. No pretense is made of
asserting that all such changes and additions are listed. An
attempt has been made, however, to include all of the im-
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portant substantive changes although no attempt is made to
signify which of the changes listed are substantive. As to
just what constitutes a change in the substance of a law is,
necessarily, a matter of opinion in a large number of cases.
Section 1-2(5) adds a definition of "fiscal year" and "municipal year" for municipalities which hold biennial or quadrennial general municipal elections.5 The definitions of these
terms, as found in Sections 100 and 137 of the former act,8 6
falsely assumed that all municipalities held an annual election and consequently were almost wholly unworkable.
Section 1-2(7) adds a provision that where reference is
made to a county within which a municipality, etc. is situated, the reference is to the county within which is situated
the major part of the area of that municipality, etc. The
former law occasionally referred to the county within which
a municipality, etc. was situated without providing for the
contingency of a municipality situated partly in two or more
counties. s7
Section 1-3 is new. It provides that all existing municipalities which were incorporated or which changed their corporate organization under the Cities and Villages Act of 1872
or under any prior general act shall remain properly incorporated under the Revised Cities and Villages Act. A municipality incorporated and existing under a special act is to
remain as properly incorporated under that act. This added
provision was considered necessary to preserve the current
status of municipalities at the time of the enactment of the
revised act.
Section 1-4, likewise new, provides that municipal officers and employees holding office or employment immediately prior to the effective date of the revised act shall continue in their offices and employments until their respective
terms expire, subject to applicable provisions as to removal.
This added provision was felt necessary to preserve the current status of officers and employees at the time of the
enactment of the revised act.
85 All sections of the Revised Cities and Villages Act may be found under the
corresponding section number in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24.
86 All references to the former law are to sections of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, and,
unless otherwise indicated, to Ch. 24 thereof.
s7 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 159 and 387.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Section 1-5, also new, specifies that the provisions of the
act which apply to municipalities whether or not incorporated under a special charter, etc. shall so apply even though
the special charter contains inconsistent provisions. The section further specifies that other provisions of the act shall
apply to municipalities incorporated under the general law
or incorporated and existing under a special charter unless
the special charter contains a conflicting provision, in which
case the special charter shall govern.
Section 7-6 provides that if a majority of the electors
voting on the question of annexation favor it, the described
territory shall "thereupon" be a part of the annexing municipality. The former law, Section 369E, provided that if such
a majority favored annexation the city council or board of
trustees "shall forthwith pass" a resolution or ordinance
annexing the territory. The thought here was to avoid the
necessity of attempting to compel a governing body to pass
a resolution or ordinance in the event that it should prove
stubborn.
By Section 7-10, reference to "property owners" of a certain territory, heretofore contained in the section which
it supersedes, to-wit: Section 408, has been changed to read
"owners of record of land" in the territory. This change
was adopted in an effort to clarify the expression "property
owners" and to make more readily ascertainable who such
8
owners are
Section 7-11 is a revision of Section 408b, which was
entitled "An Act to provide for the annexation of unincorporated territory which is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory," approved July 10, 1939. After the introduction
of Senate Bill No. 10, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People
ex rel. Gage v. Village of Wilmette,8 9 declared the former
act violative of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution because its subject was not expressed in the title.
Subsequently, the General Assembly expressed its willingness to retain Section 7-11 in the Revised Cities and Villages
Act by adopting, through Senate Amendment, 40 a completely
38 For similar changes, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, §§ 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-21, 7-40,
7-42, 23-26, and 23-30.
89 375 Ill. 420, 31 N.E. (2d) 774 (1941).
40 See Senate Journal, April 15, 1941, p. 24, for Senate Amendment No. 64.
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new revision of the section designed to meet the consituttional objection.
Laws of 1899, p. 66, § 5, had provided for the levy of a
certain tax and specified that: "The said taxes may be
used by the city, village or incorporated town to which annexation is had for the purpose for which such appropriation was made by the city, village or incorporated town
so annexed."'" By Section 7-16, this section was revised to
provide: "The fund derived from this part of the tax levy
shall be used by the annexing municipality for the purpose
for which the appropriations were made by the annexed
municipality." "May" was changed to "shall" to harmonize
this section with Section 7-17.42
Section 7-33 provides that any specified officer shall continue in office "until his successor has been elected at the
next regular municipal election in this municipality and has
qualified for office, or has been appointed and has qualified
following this election," instead of "until the next annual
municipal election of such city, village or incorporated
town, as the case may be," 4 3 since all municipalities do not
have annual municipal elections. Section 9-7 contains a similar change.
Section 7-37 provides that whenever the whole or a part
of a municipality is annexed to another municipality such
official dockets, books, and papers of justices of the peace
in the annexed municipality as pertain to the annexed territory shall be filed with any justice of the peace specified
by order of the county court of the county in which the
annexing municipality is situated, instead of by order of
the circuit court of such county." This change was made
with a view to relieving the circuit court of this administrative duty. The requirement in the former section that
all dockets, books, and papers of such justices of the peace
shall be filed with a justice of the peace so designated was
changed as indicated, inasmuch as it was presumed that
the General Assembly did not intend to require all of the
41
42
48
44

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 390. Italics added.
The latter section is a revision of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 391.
Ibid., § 400. Italics added.
Ibid., § 401.
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papers of a particular justice of the peace to be transferred when only part of the territory within his jurisdiction
had been annexed.
Section 7-39 provides that if the whole or a part of a
municipality is annexed to another municipality, all municipal officers exercising power over the territory before annexation shall cease to exercise such power, and that the
power of officers of the annexing municipality shall extend
over the territory immediately upon annexation. The section excepts justices of the peace and police magistrates
from its provisions. No section of the former law covered
this point specifically, so this new section was added to
eliminate the possibility of having two sets of officers claiming control over the same territory at the same time.
Section 7-44 authorizes any municipality, instead merely
of any village,4 5 to dissolve its incorporation upon referendum. The former law contained no authorization for the
dissolution of cities or incorporated towns.
Section 7-50 adds the requirement that all courts shall
take judicial notice of the counties in which municipalities
are situated. This addition is a codification of the rule recognized in Harding v. Strong,4 6 Sullivan v. People,47 and Sul4
livan v. People.
Section 8-2 is a revision of former Section 83. The provision in that section authorizing cities and villages to require able-bodied male inhabitants to labor on streets or
commute such labor at not more than $1.50 per day was
omitted because it was inconsistent with, and had been repealed by, Section 529, later enacted. 49 The revision of this
latter section appears in Section 69-1.
Section 9-1 omits the requirement that a person must
have resided within a city or village for thirty days before
being entitled to vote therein at any election for city or
village officers. That provision confused the requirement of
Section 46 of the Election Act,50 that in order to be eligible
to vote a person must reside "in the election district" for
45 Ibid., § 411.

46

47 114 I. 24, 28 N.E. 381 (1885).

48

42 Ill. 148 (1866).

122 Il.385, 13 N.E. 248 (1887).
See Wahl v. City of Nauvoo, 64 IlM App. 17 (1895).
50 IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46, § 65.
49
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thirty days before an election.5 The section also adds the
requirement that persons must have a permanent abode within a municipality in order to vote therein.,2
Section 9-2 is a revision of former Section 60. That section
applied to elections in cities and villages incorporated under
the Cities and Villages Act of 1872. One of the provisions
thereof, added in 1931, required a sample of the ballots to
be used "at such election" to be printed in a newspaper
published in "such city." The section was revised to require a sample ballot to be printed in a newspaper published in "the municipality," so as clearly to include elections
conducted in villages.
Section 9-16 gives a mayor the authority to appoint a
temporary successor to appointed officers whose offices become vacant by reason of death, permanent physical or
mental disability, conviction of a disqualifying crime, or
dismissal from or abandonment of office. This provision was
added to fill an "air hole" in the prior law, although the
court, in Michels v. McCarty,5s indicated by way of dictum
that a mayor may have had such authority prior to its
enactment. The section also adds a provision authorizing
an appointed officer to resign from his office and clarifies
the previous law by stating specifically when a resignation
54
becomes effective.
Section 9-21 qualifies the mayor's former power of removal by the phrase "except where otherwise provided by
statute," to safeguard the Civil Service of Cities Act.5 5 The
section also limits his power of removal to officers appointed
by him "under this Act" in line with the interpretation of
the former section as given by the court in People v. Healy."6
Section 9-35 adds the phrase "except that of acting mayor
or mayor pro tem" to the prohibition that no alderman shall
be eligible to "any office" the salary of which is payable out
51 For a discussion on this confusion, see People ex rel. Agnew v. Graham, 267
Ill. 426 at 429, 108 N.E. 699 at 701 (1915).
52 This was added to make the same conform with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46,
§ 66.
53 196 Ill. App. 493 at 499 (1915).
54 For a discussion of the confusion existing in the prior law, see Commission
Notes to Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat., Ch. 24, § 9-16.
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24%, §§ 39 et seq.
56 231 Ill. 629, 83 N.E. 453 (1908).
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of the city treasury, if, at the time of his appointment he is
a member of the city council. The necessity of this exception
is so obvious that its omission from the former law must be
regarded as an oversight.
Section 9-40 authorizes the city council to be the sole
judge of the election to office of "the aldermen" instead
of "its own members" since the section it superseded 57 had
been interpreted as not applying to the election of a mayor.5 8
Section 9-42 is a revision of former Section 39. That section gave aldermen the power to compel the attendance of
absentees "under such penalties as may be prescribed by
ordinance." In City of EarIville v. Radley,5 9 the Supreme
Court of Illinois interpreted that provision so narrowly as
to make it virtually impossible for a council legally to take
any effective action to compel attendance. To overcome that
decision, therefore, the section was revised to read: "under
whatever penalties, including a fine for a failure to attend,
the council may prescribe by ordinance."
Section 9-44 is a revision of Section 20, which simply
prohibited a mayor from voting "except in case of a tie,
when he shall give the casting vote." Since the passage of
all ordinances, and of certain resolutions and motions, 6° requires the concurrence of a majority of all members elected
to the city council, including the mayor, an alderman opposing a measure could, if he suspected the council of being
evenly divided and knew that the mayor favored the measure, refuse to vote, thus preventing a tie vote and therefore
preventing the mayor from voting. Thus a minority of a
city council 6' was, by this device always able to defeat the
will of the majority, thereby violating the fundamental democratic principle of majority rule. To obviate this possibility,
a mayor is, by Section 9-44 directed to vote not only when
the vote of the aldermen has resulted in a tie but also when
"one-half of the aldermen elected have voted in favor of
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 37.
See People ex rel. Iddings v. Dreher, 302 Ill.
50 at 54, 134 N.E. 22 at 23 (1922).
59 237 Ill.
242, 86 N.E. 624 (1908).
60 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 9-47.
61 City councils in all Illinois cities consist of a mayor and an even number of
aldermen. One-half of the aldermen, therefore, always comprise a minority of a
city council.
57
58

THE ILLINOIS REVISED CITIES AND VILLAGES

ACT

an ordinance, resolution, or motion even though there is no
tie vote." This direction also applies to the president of a
village or incorporated town by virtue of Section 9-75.
Section 9-45 is a revision of Section 41, which provided:
"It [the city council] may elect a temporary chairman in
the absence of the mayor." That section, in conformity with
the interpretation put upon it by the court in People v. Blair,6 2
was revised to read as follows: "In the absence of the
mayor, acting mayor, or mayor pro tem, the city council
may elect an alderman to act as a temporary chairman.
He shall have only the powers of a presiding officer and a
right to vote in his capacity as alderman on any ordinance,
resolution, or motion."
Section 9-48, in order to harmonize with Section 9-47,
adds to a mayor's veto power by authorizing him to veto
any resolution or motion of the type specified in Section
9-47, namely those which (1) create any liability against a
city, or (2) provide for the expenditure or appropriation of
its money, or (3) provide for the sale of any school or city
property.
Section 9-64 expanded its predecessor section 3 to include a city comptroller who is "elected" as well as one
who is "appointed," since Section 9-14 provides that a city
4
comptroller may be either elected or appointed.
Section 120 of the prior law required the collector and
treasurer, and all other officers connected with the receipt
and expenditure of money, to perform such other duties
and be subject to such other rules and regulations, as the
city council or board of trustees might prescribe by ordinance. That provision was expanded, by Section 9-70 of the
new act, to require every officer to perform such other
duties, and be subject to such other rules and regulations,
as the corporate authorities may provide by ordinance.
Section 9-74 is a revision of former Section 156a. Section
826a, which was practically identical with Section 156a, was
omitted.
Section 9-75 adds a provision for filling a vacancy in the
62

82 111. App. 570 (1899), affirmed in 181 Ill.460, 54 N.E. 1024 (1899).

63 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 118.
64

Section 9-14 is a revision of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 85.
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office of president. The absence of such a provision from
the former law would seem to have been an oversight. Section 9-76 adds a provision for filling a vacancy in the office
of a trustee in a village or incorporated town.
Section 9-82 adds a provision that the board of trustees
in villages shall consist of the president and trustees. This
provision merely makes clear what was already true, and
was suggested by Section 31 (now Section 9-39) which provided that, in cities, the city council shall consist of the mayor
and aldermen.
Section 9-83 adds a provision that Sections 9-7 and 9-8,
providing for the filling of vacancies by special election, do
not apply to vacancies in office under Section 9-83. This
provision is necessary to prevent a conflict between these
sections.
In Section 9-84, the former expression "The president
and board of trustees may appoint ..... "was revised to read:
"The president and board of trustees, voting jointly, may
appoint ....
" since that was the interpretation placed thereon by the courts.65
Section 9-90 gives the president of a village as well as the
mayor of a city the power to administer oaths. The provision may not have been necessary since the president, in
general terms, is given the same powers the mayor possesses. But it was added to eliminate doubt.
Section 9-93 adds the president of a village to the list of
those who are declared to be conservators of the peace.
Former Section 95 included trustees in villages, and, at the
time of its enactment, the trustees selected a president from
among their own number so that he was included within its
terms. Later, however, the law was changed to provide for
the popular election of a president.6 6 The president apparently would have the power granted by this section even if he
were not mentioned, for the mayor is included in the list and
the president for a long time has had the same powers as
the mayor.
Section 9-95, a revision of Section 97, omits a provision in
65 See McKean v. Gauthier, 132 IMI.App. 376 (1907); People ex rel. Janosky v.
Novotny, 273 IM. App. 254 (1934).
66 IlM.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 165.
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the former law prohibiting the salary of aldermen, in cities
over 350,000, from exceeding $3500 per year since that provision was inconsistent with and had been repealed by still
another statute 67 which fixed a $5000 maximum.
Former Section 829 prohibited the compensation of any
officer or employee of any village or incorporated town, who
was paid by a commission or percentage on money collected, handled, or paid over by him, from exceeding $5000 a
year. This prohibition has been extended to officers and
employees of cities by a House amendment to Section 9-100.
Section 10-8 authorizes the corporate authorities to require persons committed to jail for the violation of a municipal ordinance to work. The section is a revision of Section 832, which section was almost a verbatim duplication of
Section 80 except that Section 832 applied not only to cities
and villages incorporated under the Cities and Villages Act
of 1872 but to all cities and villages in Illinois. The two provisions were inconsistent in that Section 80 provided for a
two-dollar allowance for each day's work, whereas Section
832, later enacted, provided for a fifty-cent allowance. Inasmuch as the most recently enacted provision controls, the
fifty-cent allowance was retained in Section 10-8.
Section 15-1 requires the corporate authorities in municipalities of 500,000 or less inhabitants, instead of in municipalities of less than 150,000 inhabitants, to pass the annual
appropriation ordinance within a certain specified time. This
change fills a gap which existed in the former law, since
Section 102, now Section 22-1, applied only to municipalities
over 500,000. No municipalities in Illinois at the present time
have a population over 150,000 but under 500,000, but some
may have at some time in the future.
Section 15-1 also changes the number of petitioners necessary to sanction an additional appropriation from "a majority of the legal voters of such city or village" to electors
"numbering more than fifty per cent of the number of votes
cast for the candidates for mayor or president at the last
preceding . . . election at which a mayor or president was
elected." This change was necessitated by the fact that, beOT Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, § 187.
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cause of frequent population variations, it would be practically impossible to ascertain the number of legal voters
in a city or village at any given time. A similar change was
made in a number of other places.
The provision requiring the county clerk to scale taxes
under the Juul law was omitted from Section 15-13 and in
all other places where it occurred in sections which were
revised by the Revised Cities and Villages Act. The Juul law
had been repealed by the Revenue Act of 1939,69 and, for
that reason, the provision requiring scaling was omitted.
Section 16-8 was designed to restate the substance of
Sections 684 and 685. A brief analysis 'of the history of these
sections is essential to an understanding of their purport.
The Cities and Villages Act of 1872 contained no tax limit,
but a two per cent. limit was imposed in 1879. Municipalities
organized under special charters were limited only by the
terms of their respective charters. An act of 1881 provided
that municipalities whose charters did not confer power to
levy as high a rate as that therein authorized could levy a
general corporate tax up to one dollar, exclusive of taxes
for school purposes." It further provided that this rate
should be in lieu of the charter rate for general corporate
purposes. By its terms, the act applied only to a limited number of municipalities. It was amended in 1909, 1919, and 1927
to cut the previous one dollar general rate to sixty cents,
forty cents, and twenty cents respectively.
In 1897 another act,7 that of 1877, was amended so as
to confer upon all municipalities power to assess and collect
taxes at the rate then provided in the Cities and Villages
Act, i. e. two dollars. It was held, in People ex tel. Town of
Cicero v. Knopf,7 2 that this act did not repeal the taxing
powers conferred by special charters but was intended to
benefit specially chartered municipalities which were limited by their charters to a rate below the two-dollar rate
authorized in the Cities and Villages Act.
Since these two acts were passed to cover different situ8

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 120, §§ 329-330a.

69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 809.
70
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Ibid., Ch. 24, § 685.
186 1l. 457, 57 N. E. 1059 (1900).

71 ]21. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 684.
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ations, one being general and the other limited in scope,
both probably were still in effect prior to the enactment of
the Revised Cities and Villages Act. Thus, although Section
16-8 was designed to restate the substance of these two acts,
it may actually confer some additional taxing power, since
it excludes school taxes from the two per cent. alternative
tax limit, whereas the 1897 law imposed a two per cent. total
tax limit on certain municipalities, including school taxes.
Section 17-5 changes the requirement of the former law
that the county clerk shall annually extend taxes against
"all of the taxable property situated in the county that contains any such city, village or incorporated town" to "all of
the taxable property contained in the municipality or in that
portion thereof which is situated in his county." This change
was considered essential to avoid the impression that the
county clerk is to extend the tax against all of the taxable
property situated in the county.
Section 19-66 limits the power of initiative to ordinances
"the subject matter of which is legislative in character."
By this limitation, the statute conforms to the holding in
3
People ex rel. Holvey v. Kapp."
In Section 19-71 the reference to "writs of error from the
appellate court" has been omitted as being obsolete under
the Civil Practice Act.74
Section 19-76 provides for the submission of bids and
awarding of certain contracts of $500 or more in cities and
villages under the commission form of municipal government. The expression "except as otherwise provided" was
added to its provisions inasmuch as a municipality under that
form of government may, according to the decision in Huggins v. City of Pinckneyville7 5 disregard this provision and
proceed under Section 58-1 which was, heretofore, Section 129.
In Section 20-11 the expression limiting the total salary
of the mayor "and" each commissioner to $300 a year was
changed to the mayor "or" each commissioner to avoid the
possible construction that the mayor and commissioners
together can receive no more than $300 annually.
738
74
75

355 IMl. 596, 189 N. E. 920 (1934).
III. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 198.
239 l1. App. 213 (1925).
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Section 22-9 omits the words "and approved" in the provision requiring an ordinance to be published after it has been
"adopted and approved." An ordinance may be adopted without the mayor's approval or despite his disapproval.
Section 22-17 adds the provision that no tax can be levied
under that section if the municipality has previously issued
the maximum amount of bonds permitted under Section
22-16. This addition codifies the holding in People ex Tel.
76
McDonough v. Mills Novelty Company.
A former statute provided that in all cities of 150,000 inhabitants or over "every mason contractor" must obtain a
license. 77 That expression was ambiguous since it did not
make it clear whether (1) all mason contractors resident in
such a city must obtain a license whether they work in or
outside the corporate limits, or (2) all mason contractors
working in such a city must obtain a license whether they
reside in or outside the corporate limits. Section 94 of that
statute cleared this matter up somewhat by requiring the
various boards of examiners to designate the places for the
examination of all applicants desiring to engage in or work
at the business of mason contracting within their respective
jurisdictions. The provision in question 71 was, therefore, revised by Section 22-43 of the new act to require "every person desiring to engage in the business of a mason contractor ... within a municipality with a population of 150,000 or
more" to obtain a license.
Section 23-6 is a revision of former Section 65.4. The provision in that section prohibiting a city or village from becoming indebted in the aggregate to exceed five per cent. of
the value of the taxable property therein, was omitted since
it was inconsistent with and had been repealed by Section
44 of the Railroad and Improvement Aid Bond Act which had
79
set a two and one-half per cent. limit.
Section 65.13 of the former law authorized the corporate authorities: "To regulate the use of sidewalks and all
structures thereunder." Section 65.56 authorized them: "To
76 357 Ill.
285 at 297, 192 N. E. 236 at 241 (1934).
77
78
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I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 91.
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regulate the construction, repairs, and use of vaults. . . areas
." and the like. These provisions were combined, in Section 23-20, so as to authorize the corporate authorities: "To
regulate the use of sidewalks, the construction, repair, and
use of openings in sidewalks, and all vaults and structures
thereunder ......
In Section 23-30, the former provision prohibiting the
corporate authorities, except upon petition, from granting
the right to lay tracks in streets to "any steam, dummy,
electric, cable, horse or other railroad company," was modernized so as to read "any railroad or street railway corporation. "
In much the same way the power "to license, regulate,
tax and restrain runners for stages, cars, public houses, or
other things or persons" was, by Section 23-52, modernized
to confer the power "to license, tax, regulate, and prohibit
runners for cabs, busses, railroads, ships, hotels, public
houses, and other similar businesses."
Section 23-63 is a combination of the powers granted by
Sections 65.45, 65.49, and 65.51. The power to regulate the
sale of meats, poultry, fish, butter, cheese, lard, vegetables,
and all other provisions was broadened into the power to
regulate the sale of all food for human consumption.
In Section 23-70 the power to prescribe the manner of
constructing stone, brick and other buildings was changed
to the power to prescribe the manner of constructing all
buildings.
In Section 23-100 the power to provide by ordinance that
"all the paper, printing, stationery, blanks, fuel and all the
supplies needed" for the use of the municipality shall be furnished by contract let to the lowest bidder was condensed to
cover "all supplies needed for the use of the municipality."
In Section 24-9 the provision specifying that any tax so
levied should not exceed one mill on the dollar on the assessed value of all taxable property within the municipality
was omitted as being almost surely violative of Article IX,
Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution.
The provision in Section 575, the predecessor to Section
32-6, requiring that bonds issued under the section should
mature within thirty years after their issuance, was changed
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to require them to mature within twenty years. This reduction
of the time limit was regarded as necessary inasmuch as the
thirty-year provision almost surely violated Article IX, Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution.
The provision in Section 669, of which Section 38-1 is a
revision, requiring foreign fire insurance companies to pay
a tax on gross receipts received by their agencies in certain
municipalities and fire protection districts for insurance
effected therein, was changed to require such companies to
pay such tax on gross receipts received for insurance effected
on property situated therein. This change was made for the
reason that not all gross receipts received for such insurance are received by the local agency; some receipts are
sent directly to the main office. Section 38-1 also adds a provision that accounts shall be rendered to the municipal comptroller, if there is one. The former law required accounts to
be rendered to the municipal clerk or secretary of the fire
protection district.
Section 49-14 was added to the Revised Cities and Villages
Act by a Senate amendment."' The section provides that no
election for the acquisition, construction, or operation of a
public utility shall be held within twelve months after a similar question has been submitted to and rejected by the
electors.
Section 60-17 is a revision of Section 490p(8), which required that the ordinance provided for therein be printed
at least once in a newspaper published and of general circulation in the municipality. Section 60-17 adds the provision
that if there is no such newspaper, the ordinance shall be
posted in at least three public places in the municipality.
This provision was added for the benefit of municipalities
which have no such newspapers.81
Reference to the "health commissioner or commissioners" in former Section 535 was changed, in Section 71-1, to
refer to the "board of health or public health board" since
not all municipalities have health commissioners and such
health commissioners as do exist are members of the board
of health or public health board of the municipality.
80 See Senate Journal, April 15, 1941, 34, amendment No. 128.
81 See Laws 1931, 373, § 3.
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In Section 74-3 the power to make rules "for the levying
and collecting of any water taxes, rates or assessments" was
changed to the power to make rules for the fixing and collecting of water rates or rents inasmuch as water rates are
not taxes and the expression "levying . . . water taxes . . .
or assessments" is, therefore, inaccurate. 2
Section 83-2 is a revision of Section 835. That section
prohibited an officer from compelling any person under arrest, etc., to ride in an uncovered patrol wagon "or" through
the public streets. The word "or" was omitted, since its
use was apparently inadvertent.
Section 84-6 increases, from 75,000 to 100,000, the maximum population of municipalities which may fix salaries of
the board of local improvements. The section authorizes the
council, in cities under 100,000, instead of under 75,000, which
have the commission form of municipal government, to provide that the board of local improvements shall consist of
the mayor and any two commissioners. The changes were
necessary in order to continue the boards of local improvements in Springfield and East St. Louis, whose populations,
according to the 1940 census, exceeded 75,000.
Section 87-1 adds a provision that the Revised Cities
and Villages Act shall not repeal any of the jurisdiction
or powers possessed immediately prior to the effective date
of the act by any department, board, commission, or officer
of the state government. This provision was considered necessary in order to preserve the then current status of state
commissions, departments, boards, and officers.
82
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